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Abstract
We study the welfare gains from trade in an economy with heterogeneous firms, vari-
able markups and endogenous growth. Variable markups arise from oligopolistic compe-
tition, and cost-reducing innovation is the engine of long-run growth. Trade liberalization
stiffens competition by reducing markups, generating tougher firm selection and increasing
the aggregate productivity level. Selection increases firms’ incentives to innovate, thereby
leading to a higher aggregate productivity growth rate. Endogenous productivity growth
boosts the selection gains from trade, leading to substantial welfare improvements. A
calibrated version of the model shows that growth doubles the welfare gains obtainable
in models with static firm-level productivity.
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If the gains from trade are small, is it worth facing the potentially disruptive distributional
consequences of globalization?1 Assessing the size and identifying the sources of gains from
trade is a long standing challenge for economists. In the last decades, a new line of research
introducing firm heterogeneity in trade models has uncovered a new source of welfare gains.
Trade-induced reallocations of market shares from low to highly productive firms within the
same industries increase sectorial efficiency, leading to improvements in aggregate productivity
and to potentially large welfare gains. However, selection also carries welfare losses that can
possibly outweigh the gains: firms’ exit has a negative effect on welfare by reducing the variety
of goods available in the economy.
Theoretical and quantitative analyses assessing the contribution of the selection margin
have mainly featured market structures with perfect or monopolistic competition, focused on
static models or on dynamic economies without long-run productivity growth. The goal of
this paper is to fill these gaps by providing a theory of trade with heterogeneous firms under
oligopolistic competition and innovation-driven productivity growth. On the one hand, because
of ‘cross-hauling’ of identical goods, oligopoly trade is potentially wasteful, therefore represent-
ing a more difficult environment to obtain welfare gains. On the other hand, trade reduces
markups thereby generating pro-competitive effects which are absent in environments where
firms’ market power is constant. Moreover, innovation-driven growth can potentially magnify
the gains from selection, as market share reallocations can affect not only the productivity
level but also its growth rate. We show that the new gains due to selection can be substantial
and that their dynamic component due to the interaction between selection, innovation and
productivity growth magnifies the gains obtainable in static models with firm heterogeneity.
Our model economy features a continuum of imperfectly substitutable varieties, or product
lines, brought to the market by firms with different productivities. Differently from the standard
Melitz (2003) model, each variety is produced by a small number of identical firms operating
in an oligopolistic market. So individual firms are “large in the small but small in the large”:
relevant actors in their own market, interacting strategically with their direct competitors, but
infinitesimal in the economy as a whole (Neary, 2010). Upon paying a sunk cost, a small
number of firms enters each product line by drawing their productivity from a distribution
1Recent theoretical and empirical work shows that trade can have adverse effects on employment and on
wage and income inequality. See e.g. Cosar et al (2014), Felbermayr et al (2014), Helpman et al (2014), Autor
et al (2014), and Acemoglu et al (2015).
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of existing technologies. If entry is successful, firms compete Cournot with their rivals in the
product line and invest in innovation to improve their productivity over time. Firms’ innovation
activity generates endogenous growth through within-variety knowledge spillovers typical of
quality ladders models (e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 1991). The open economy features two
symmetric countries engaging in costly trade. Since firms in each product line produce perfectly
substitutable goods, two-ways trade takes place because of strategic interaction between firms,
as in Brander and Krugman (1983).
We first present a simple and analytically tractable version of the model in which the
number of oligopolistic firms per product line is fixed, and all operating firms export. Trade
liberalization can potentially generate static and dynamic gains from selection. First, a re-
duction in trade costs increases product market competition reducing markups. Reductions
in markups force the least productive firms out of the market, reallocating resources toward
surviving firms, increasing their average size and aggregate productivity. Second, the increase
in surviving firms’ size stimulates cost-reducing innovation thereby leading to faster productiv-
ity growth. Finally, selection involves potential welfare losses since exit reduces the number of
varieties available to consumers. We show analytically that faster growth generates dynamic
selection gains from trade, and that under plausible parameter restrictions static selection gains
can be also obtained.
We perform a quantitative evaluation of our theory in a more general version of the model
where we endogenize the number of oligopolistic firms competing in each product line through
free entry. We also introduce fixed export costs leading to an equilibrium where only the
most productive firms export and charge a different markup compared to domestic firms. This
markup difference proves to be crucial in generating trade-induced selection effects under free
entry. Without markup dispersion the marginal and the entering firm would have the same
profit opportunities, and the marginal firm would be indifferent to profit changes induced by
trade. In this generalized framework there are two additional forces at work: first, by increasing
market size, trade raises the number of firms within each product line, thereby leading to a
stronger pro-competitive effect. Second, lower trade costs induce more firms to start exporting.
The new exporters experience an increase in market size pushing them to innovate more. This
extensive margin of trade generates additional static and dynamic welfare gains.
We calibrate the model to match salient firm-level and aggregate statistics of the US economy
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and solve it numerically. Moving from a prohibitive level of variable trade costs, autarky, to
a 8.6% import penetration ratio reduces the markup of non-exporting firms forcing the less
productive of them out of the market. Exporters reduce their markup on domestic sales due
to fiercer foreign competition and increase the markup on foreign sales: pricing-to-market
allows them to avoid passing the whole reduction in trade costs on foreign consumers. As
profitability of export increases, more firms enter the export market. The average markup
in the economy drops by about 29% generating a large pro-competitive effect of trade on
prices. Fiercer competition and selection increase the market size of more productive firms
(exporters), thereby raising their incentives to innovate ultimately leading to a 57% increase
in aggregate productivity growth. These effects compound into large welfare gains: long-run
consumption increases by 50%, and about half of this change is accounted for by dynamic gains.
Hence productivity dynamics doubles the gains obtainable in an oligopoly trade model with
firm heterogeneity and static firm-level productivity. Moreover, we compare the benchmark
economy with a version of it where the selection margins do not respond to trade liberalization.
We find that the overall welfare gains from trade are about 12 times and the dynamic gains are
about 5 times higher in the benchmark model compared to its version where selection is not
operative. This suggests that the interaction between selection and innovation/driven growth
is fundamental in generating large welfare gains from trade liberalization.
Literature review. The paper is related to several strands of literature. A novel set of
empirical regularities about trade, competition and innovation has recently emerged from a
large number of studies using firm-level data. First, trade-induced selection reallocates resources
from less to more productive firms triggering increases in aggregate productivity.2 A second line
of research has shown that trade liberalization cleans the market of inefficient firms and forces
surviving firms to innovate more (Bustos, 2011, Aw et al., 2010, Lleiva and Trefler, 2010, and
Bloom et al., 2016). Third, trade has pro-competitive effects by reducing prices and markups
(e.g. Feenstra and Weinstein, 2016, De Loecker et al., 2016). Finally, Griffith et al. (2010)
find that the EU Single Market Programme (SMP) was associated with increased product
market competition and a subsequent increase in innovation and productivity growth. Our
paper presents a rich model providing a coherent interpretation of these empirical regularities.
Trade liberalization increases product market competition, triggers firm selection and stimulates
2See Bernard et al (2012) for a survey.
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innovation leading to higher aggregate productivity growth.
Our model features trade under oligopoly as in Brander and Krugman (1983) pioneer-
ing work.3 We extend their model to an economy with firm heterogeneity and productivity
growth. Similarly to them, the wasteful nature of oligopoly trade can potentially offset the
pro-competitive effects leading to losses from trade, but the new channels of firms selection and
endogenous growth introduce additional sources of gains from trade.
This paper is also related to the endogenous growth literature in several ways. In a re-
cent survey, Grossman and Helpman (2015) discuss the fundamental channels linking trade
and growth: international knowledge spillovers, market size and competition, relative prices,
and technology diffusion. In modern environments with firm heterogeneity, the link between
trade openness and productivity growth is still shaped by these classical channels. Baldwin
and Robert-Nicoud (2008), introduce firm heterogeneity in an endogenous growth model of
expanding product varieties (Romer, 1990) and find that the selection effect of trade on growth
depends on the form of international knowledge spillovers. In a more general setup, with firm
and worker heterogeneity, Grossman and Helpman (2014) show that under an arbitrary (pos-
itive) pattern of international knowledge spillovers, open economies innovate and grow more
than closed ones. In old and new endogenous growth models, lower trade barriers tend to
increase market size, thereby increasing innovation. This market size effect can be offset by an
adverse competition effect: the successful innovators must share the market with foreign com-
petitors. In Grossman and Helpman (2014) baseline economy these two effects exactly offset
each other. Finally, recent papers have explored the role of trade in accelerating knowledge dif-
fusion. Sampson (2016) studies welfare gains in a model where productivity growth is driven by
knowledge diffusion at the entry stage. Trade-induced selection accelerates knowledge diffusion
and growth, thereby tripling the gains from trade relative to heterogeneous firms’ economies
with static productivity at the firm level. Along similar lines, Perla et al. (2015) set up a model
where growth is driven by knowledge diffusion between incumbent firms, and show that trade
accelerates technology diffusion and growth.
In a key departure from the literature discussed above, our economy features neither inter-
national knowledge spillovers nor technology diffusion. Trade stimulates innovation and growth
by increasing product market competition: fiercer foreign competition reduces markups thereby
3Recent applications are in Neary (2003) and Eckel and Neary (2010); a literature review in Neary (2010).
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triggering selection, reallocation and faster productivity growth. Peretto (2003) analyses the
effects of trade on growth in an endogenous growth model with variable markups. Bertrand
competition among oligopolistic producers generates, under some conditions, pro-competitive
effects of trade triggering faster innovation and growth. In line with Peretto (2003), our econ-
omy features markups responding endogenously to trade costs, but we depart by introducing
firm heterogeneity and studying the effects of trade on growth through selection.4 We depart
from Sampson (2016) and Perla et al. (2015) by generating growth through innovation instead
of technology diffusion, and complement their results showing that dynamic gains from trade
through innovation-driven growth can be substantial.
Finally, a stream of papers has recently analyzed the welfare effects of selection in static
models, or in models without long-run productivity growth. Arkolakis et al. (2012) show that
welfare gains in a wide class of old and new trade models depend only on the change in the
trade share and on the Armington elasticity of trade to changes in trade costs. If a given change
in trade costs generates the same change in trade shares across models, gains from trade will
be the same. Atkeson and Burstein (2010) set up a model with process and product innovation
where trade has only transitional effects on growth. Selection produces welfare gains from trade
through process innovation that are offset by losses through product innovation. Melitz and
Redding (2015) find that Arkolakis et al.’s results hold only under some parameter restrictions,
including the assumption that firm productivity follows an unbounded Pareto distribution.
Deviations from these restrictions, such as assuming a bounded Pareto (Melitz and Redding,
2015) or a log-normal distribution (Head et al., 2014), allow heterogeneous firms models to
generate substantial welfare gains from selection. All these papers feature models with either
perfect or monopolistic competition and analyse static economies or dynamic economies without
long-run productivity growth. Focusing on oligopoly in an economy with endogenous growth,
we show that large gains from selection can be obtained even with an unbounded Pareto
productivity distribution.
Section 2 sets up the basic two-country trade model where all firms export and the number
of oligopolistic firms is exogenously given. This simple model is extended in Section 3, allowing
for an endogenous number of firms in each product line through free entry and for selection
into the export market. Section 4 quantitatively analyses the effects of trade liberalization on
4Licandro and Navas-Ruiz (2011), work out a version of Peretto (2003) with Cournot competition and show
that the growth effect of trade can be obtained independently on international knowledge spillovers.
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innovation, growth and welfare. Section 5 discusses the role of endogenous markups in shaping
the contribution of selection to the aggregate welfare gains from trade. Section 6 concludes.
1 The model
This section presents a simple version of the model economy designed to illustrate the basic
properties of the suggested theory. In a two-country world with symmetric technologies, pref-
erences and endowments, both countries produce exactly the same set of differentiated goods
which can be traded at the iceberg trade costs. Within a given variety, firms from both coun-
tries compete a` la Cournot for market shares. At entry, firms in the same product line jointly
draw their productivity from a given distribution; consequently, firms producing the same vari-
ety are equally productive, but productivity differs across varieties. After entry, firms allocate
resources to increase their productivity. The innovation technology features within-variety
knowledge spillovers at the country level generating sustained growth under a stationary pro-
ductivity distribution. In steady state, the productivity distribution permanently moves to the
right as a traveling wave. In what follows we will restrict the analysis to the state equilibrium.
1.1 Economic environment
Preferences. Time is continuous and denoted by t, with initial time t = 0. Each country is
populated by a unit mass of identical consumers with preferences represented by
U =
∞∫
0
(lnXt + β lnYt) e
−ρt dt, (1)
with discount factor ρ > 0. There are two types of goods, a homogeneous good Y and a
differentiated good X. A continuum of varieties of endogenous mass Mt ∈ (0, 1) represents the
differentiated good according to
Xt =
 Mt∫
0
xαjt dj

1
α
, (2)
where xjt is the consumption of variety j, α ∈ (0, 1), and 1/ (1− α) is the elasticity of sub-
stitution. Consumers are endowed with a unit flow of labor, which among other uses can be
transformed one-to-one into the homogeneous good. In this sense, Y can also be interpreted as
leisure. The labor endowment, or equivalently the homogeneous good, is taken as the numeraire.
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Technology and market structure. In each country, any variety j is produced by n identi-
cal firms, manufacturing perfectly substitutable goods. We assume that n is exogenously given.
Because of countries’ symmetry there are 2n identical firms in each product line. Firms use
labor to cover both variable production costs and a fixed production cost λ > 0. Productivity
differ across varieties, thus we omit index j and identify varieties with their productivity, which
we denote by z˜. A firm with productivity z˜, employing l workers to produce q units of output,
has production technology
lt = z˜
−η
t qt + λ. (3)
with η > 0.5
Incumbent firms may undertake process innovation according to the R&D technology
˙˜zt = Aktht, (4)
where ht represents labor allocated to innovation, A > 0 is an efficiency parameter, and kt is
an externality defined as follows,
kt = Dt z˜
c
t . (5)
Knowledge spillovers, z˜c, represent the average productivity of domestic direct competitors –
those producing the same variety. The more productive direct competitors are the more effective
R&D is in enhancing productivity. This specification of innovation technology is commonly
used in the endogenous growth literature to generate a constant steady state growth rate.6 In
a symmetric equilibrium z˜c = z˜. Innovation difficulty is measured by the inverse of Dt,
Dt =
Z˜t
(z˜ct )
ηˆ
and Z˜t =
1
Mt
Mt∫
0
z˜ηˆjt dj
where ηˆ ≡ ηα/ (1− α) and Z˜t is the average productivity of the overall economy. Innovating is
harder for firms in highly productive produce lines. As shown later, this assumption equalizes
productivity growth rates across varieties, stationarising the equilibrium productivity distribu-
tion. A similar assumption is commonly used in R&D-driven growth models with homogeneous
5We may think of this technological structure as a streamlined representation of a real economy in the
following way. First, the set of firms is divided in small groups producing the closest possible goods in terms
substitutability. We call the goods they produce a variety or product line. Second, to keep the model tractable,
we assume homogeneity in productivity within varieties, but heterogeneity across varieties. This simplified
technological structure does not capture only heterogeneity across the ‘few’ observable sectors in the data, but
also the productivity difference across the ‘many’ firms producing imperfectly substitutable goods.
6Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Grossman and Helpman (1991) adopt a similar knowledge spillovers structure
to obtain sustained growth in Schumpeterian growth models.
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firms to eliminate counterfactual scale effects and stationarise models with growing population
(e.g. Jones, 1995, Kortum, 1997, and Segerstrom, 1998).7 In recent models of endogenous
growth with heterogeneous firms, such as Klette and Kortum (2004), increasing innovation dif-
ficulty is introduced to stationarise the productivity distribution and match a robust stylized
fact in the data: larger firms invest more in R&D, but the growth rate of productivity does not
scale with size.8
Finally, let us define the entry technology. There is a unit mass of potential varieties of
which Mt ∈ (0, 1) are operative. At any time t, a new variety among the 1−Mt non operative
varieties can be introduced at zero cost by the n firms associated to it, which jointly draw
a productivity from an initial distribution. Moreover, in each period firms are subject to an
exogenous death shock δ.
1.2 Equilibrium
We now turn to the steady-state equilibrium of this economy.
Households. The representative household maximizes utility subject to its budget constraint.
For given interest rate r and prices pjt, the corresponding first order conditions read
Y = βE, (6)
E˙
E
= r − ρ, (7)
pjt =
E
Xαt
xα−1jt . (8)
where E =
M∫
0
pjtxjt dj is total expenditure on the composite good. For variables that are
constant in steady state, like r, Y, E and M , index t is omitted to simplify notation. Because
of log preferences, total spending in the homogeneous good is β times total spending in the dif-
ferentiated good. Equation (7) is the standard Euler equation implying r = ρ at the stationary
equilibrium, and (8) is the inverse demand function for variety j.
Cournot equilibrium. Let qd,t and τqf,t be the quantities produced by a domestic firm for
the domestic and foreign markets, respectively, and let qx,t = qd,t + τqf,t be total firm’s output.
Total domestic consumption of a particular variety is xt = n(qd,t + qf,t), smaller than total
7Empirical evidence supports decreasing returns to innovation –see Kortum (1993) and Blundell et al (2002).
8See Klette and Kortum (2004), fact 1, and Griliches (2000) for the supporting empirical evidence.
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production nqx,t, the difference being equal to the iceberg trade cost τ > 1. Under Cournot
competition countries import goods that perfectly substitute domestic goods in the presence
of positive variable trade costs. As in Brander and Krugman (1983), cross-hauling in similar
products occurs because firms play separate Cournot games in the domestic and foreign markets.
At any time s, s ≥ 0, a firm producing a particular variety solves the following problem
Vs = max
(qd,t,qf,t,ht)
∞
t=s
∫ ∞
s
[(
pd,t − z˜−ηt
)
qd,t +
(
pf,t − τ z˜−ηt
)
qf,t − ht − λ
]
e−(ρ+δ)(t−s)dt
s.t.
pd,t =
E
Xαt
xα−1d,t and pf,t =
E
Xαt
xα−1f,t (9)
xd,t = xˆd,t + qd,t and xf,t = xˆf,t + qf,t
˙˜zt = Aktht.
The firm cash flow is discounted at ρ+δ. The first pair of constraints represents the domestic and
foreign inverse demand functions. The second pair splits total domestic and foreign demands
between its own sales, qd,t and qf,t, and those of direct domestic and foreign competitors, xˆd,t
and xˆf,t. The third constraint is the innovation technology. In a Cournot game a firm takes as
given the path of its competitors’ production xˆt, the path of the externality kt, as well as the
path of the aggregates E and Xt. Symmetry implies Ed = Ef = E and Xd,t = Xf,t = Xt.
We solve this differential game focusing on Nash equilibrium in open loop strategies –see
Appendix A.1 for details. Denoting by vt the costate variable associated to z˜t, writing the first
order conditions and imposing symmetry, xd,t = xf,t = xt, we get[
(α− 1) qd,t
xt
+ 1
]
pd,t = z˜
−η
t (10)[
(α− 1) qf,t
xt
+ 1
]
pf,t = τ z˜
−η
t (11)
vtAkt = 1, (12)
ηz˜−η−1t
vt
(qd,t + τqf,t) =
− ·vt
vt
+ ρ+ δ. (13)
Since pd,t = pf,t = pt, from the conditions above we derive the equilibrium price
pt =
z˜−ηt
θd
=
τ z˜−ηt
θf
, (14)
where θd = (2n+ α− 1) /n (1 + τ) and θf = τθd are the inverse of the markups charged in
the domestic and foreign markets respectively. Notice that a reduction in trade costs τ raises
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θd, since the domestic market becomes more competitive due to the penetration of foreign
firms. The pro-competitive effect of trade operates through this mechanism. Notice also that
lowering the trade cost leads to higher markups on foreign sales. This happens because exporters
enjoy a cost reduction in their shipments while domestic firms do not benefit from it. Hence,
exporters can optimally charge a higher markup, not passing the whole cost reduction onto
foreign consumers.9
It is important to notice that θf reaches one when τ = τ¯ ≡ n/(n + α − 1); τ¯ corresponds
to prohibitive trade costs, a limit above which the export markup becomes negative and firms
do not export. Hence, autarky is obtained in our framework as a particular case where the
trade cost is equal or larger than its prohibitive level. The domestic markup in autarky is
θd = θn ≡ (n+ α− 1) /n, since domestic firms face no foreign competition in the domestic
market.
In line with Brander and Krugman (1983), the cost of importing goods that could be
otherwise produced locally can be measured by
A = qd,t + τqf,t
qd,t + qf,t
=
(1− n− α) (1 + τ 2) + 2nτ
(1− α)(1 + τ) ≥ 1,
defined as the ratio of total production to total consumption of the same variety, which we
call the cross-hauling ratio. Let us now define the firm’s average markup as the ratio of total
revenue to variable production costs
1
θx
=
pt(qd,t + qf,t)
z˜−ηt (qd,t + τqf,t)
.
It is easy to see that θx = Aθd. The gap between firm’s average and domestic markup is equal
to the cross-hauling ratio. Notice that θx is decreasing in variable trade costs τ ,
∂θx
∂τ
= −2(τ − 1) (2n− 1 + α)
2
n (1 + τ)3 (1− α) ≤ 0, (15)
reaching its maximum (2n− 1 + α) /2n when τ = 1. The autarky value θn is reached when
τ = τ¯ . Intuitively, an increase in τ increases the domestic markups 1/θd and decreases the
export markup 1/θf , but since 1/θd > 1/θf , the former effect prevails and the average markup
increases with trade costs. This is the source of the pro-competitive effect of trade that we will
explore in detail later.
9Pricing to market in Atkeson and Burstein (2008) is generated through the same mechanism.
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Combining (10) and (11) leads to the following expression for variable production costs,
z˜−ηt qx,t = θxe z/z¯, (16)
where e ≡ E/(nM) is average expenditure per firm, z = z˜ηˆjt e−ηˆgt is firm’s detrended productiv-
ity, g is the endogenous growth rate of productivity –computed below– and z¯ = (1/M)
∫M
0
zjdj
is average detrended productivity. Variable production costs in (16) are the product of average
expenditures per firm, the inverse of the firm’s average markup and the relative productivity
of the firm. When the environment becomes more competitive, θx increases, prices decline,
produced quantities increase and firms demand more inputs.
Optimal conditions (12) and (13) imply an equilibrium growth rate of productivity
g ≡
˙˜z
z˜
= ηAθxe− ρ− δ, (17)
the same for all firms. Equilibrium innovation for firm z can be derived using (4), (5) and (17),
h(z) = (ηθxe− ρˆ) z/z¯, (18)
where ρˆ = (ρ+ δ) /A. Labor resources allocated to innovation h are directly proportional
to firm’s relative productivity z/z¯. Equation (18) shows that more productive firms make a
larger innovation effort: since they produce more and innovation is cost-reducing, the benefits
of a reduction in the unit production cost are increasing in size. This is consistent with the
empirical evidence showing that more productive firms spend more on innovation without
featuring higher growth rates of productivity (e.g. Lentz and Mortensen, 2008, and Akcigit
and Kerr, 2011). The specific form of the externality k in (5) allows for the growth rate to be
equal across firms in steady state, offsetting the positive effect that the relative productivity
has on innovation effort. Moreover, notice that a reduction in the markup, increases market
efficiency and incumbent firms’ market size, thereby stimulating innovation. Since there is no
innovation in the homogeneous good sector, (1)-(3) imply that the growth rate of output is
ggdp =
η
1 + β
g, (19)
where 1/(1 + β) represents the share of the composite good in total consumption expenditure.
Entry and exit. At any time t, there is a mass of potential varieties 1−M , each produced
by n firms, trying to enter the economy at zero cost. A productivity z is drawn for each of them
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from a time-invariant initial distribution Γ(z), which is assumed to be continuous in (zmin,∞),
0 ≤ zmin <∞. Notice that the entry distribution is defined on detrended productivity z. Since
equilibrium productivity growth g is the same for all product lines, the (detrended) produc-
tivity distribution of incumbents is stationary. Defining the entry distribution on detrended
productivity z, allows the equilibrium (detrended) productivity distribution be stationary as
well. It is important to notice that the externality that makes new entrants benefit from incum-
bents productivity gains does not represent an engine of growth. Growth is driven by firm-level
innovation, in the absence of which equilibrium yields zero long-run growth.10
The stationary cutoff productivity z∗ is determined by the exit condition
pi(z˜∗) =
(
pt − z˜∗−ηt
)
qdt +
(
pt − τ z˜∗−ηt
)
qft − ht − λ = 0,
which evaluated at steady state equilibrium prices and quantities can be written as
pi(z∗/z¯) = (1− θx) e z∗/z¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
net revenues
− (ηθxe− ρˆ) z∗/z¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
innovation cost
−λ = 0.
Notice that both net revenues and innovation costs depend on firm’s distance from average
productivity, z∗/z¯. In the following, we assume η to be small enough such that 1− (1+η)θ > 0,
a sufficient condition for the cash flow to depend positively on z. Rearranging terms,
e =
λ
z∗/z¯ − ρˆ
1− (1 + η)θx . (EC)
Irrespective of their productivity, varieties are assumed to exogenously exit at rate δ > 0.
Stationarity of the mass of product lines M requires (1−M) (1− Γ(z∗)) = δM . This condition
states that the exit flow, δM , equals the entry flow defined by the number of entrants, 1−M ,
times the probability of surviving, 1− Γ(z∗). Consequently,
M = M(z∗) ≡ 1− Γ(z
∗)
1 + δ − Γ(z∗) , (20)
a decreasing function of the productivity cutoff productivity z∗, M ∈ (0, 1/ (1 + δ) ).
Let us denote by µ (z) the stationary equilibrium density. The endogenous exit process
related to the cutoff productivity z∗ implies µ (z) = 0 for all z < z∗. Since the equilibrium
productivity growth rates are the same irrespective of z, and the death shock is independent
of firm productivity, in a stationary environment surviving firms remain always at their initial
10In models of technology diffusion, such as Sampson (2016), the entry process is instead the driver of long-run
productivity growth.
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position in the distribution Γ. Consequently, the stationary equilibrium distribution is µ(z) =
f(z)/(1− Γ(z∗)), for z ≥ z∗, where f is the density associated to the entry distribution Γ. We
can now write average productivity z¯ as a function of z∗, z¯(z∗) =
∞∫
z∗
zµ(z)dz.
Market clearing. The labor market clearing condition can be written as
nM
∫ ∞
z∗
(l(z) + h(z))µ (z) dz + Y = nM
∫ ∞
z∗
{[(1 + η) θe− ρˆ] z/z¯ + λ}µ (z) d(z) + βE = 1.
The unit labor endowment is allocated to production and innovation activities in the com-
posite sector, as well as to production in the homogeneous sector. The second equality is
obtained substituting l from (3), Y from (6), and using (4), (16) and (18). Since
∫∞
z∗ µ (z) dz =∫∞
z∗ z/z¯ µ (z) dz = 1, after integrating over all varieties we obtain
e =
1
nM(z∗) + ρˆ− λ
β + (1 + η)θx
, (MC)
a positive relationship between e and z∗.
Existence and unicity. Next we prove existence and unicity of equilibrium.
Assumption 1. The entry distribution is such that
z∗/z¯(z∗) is non-decreasing in z∗, (a)
and the following parameter restrictions hold:
z¯e/zmin > ρˆ (b)
(1 + η)θx > Ψ (c)
where z¯e is the average productivity at entry and
Ψ =
(1+δ)
n
+ ρˆ(1 + β)− λ
(
1 + β z¯e
zmin
)
(1+δ)
n
+ λ
(
z¯e
zmin
− 1
) .
Assumption (a) makes the right-hand-side of (EC) non-increasing in z∗. As discussed in Melitz
(2003), many common distributions satisfy condition (a).11 Indeed, if the productivity distri-
bution is Pareto, (EC) is horizontal. As stated in Proposition 1 below, under assumptions (b)
and (c) (EC) cuts (MC) from above, which is sufficient for existence and unicity of equilibrium.
Figure 1 provides a graphical representation.
11More precisely, condition (a) is satisfied by the Lognormal, Exponential, Gamma, Weibul, or truncations
on (0,+∞) of the Normal, Logistic, Extreme value, or Laplace distributions. See Melitz (2003).
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1+δ
n +
ρ+δ
A −λ
β+(1+η)θx
MC
EC
MC ′
EC ′
z∗0 z∗1
Figure 1: Equilibrium
Proposition 1 Under Assumption 1 and for τ ∈ [1, τ¯ ], there exits a unique interior solution
(e, z∗) of (MC) and (EC), with M(z∗) determined by (20).
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
1.3 Trade liberalization
This section, analyses the effects of trade liberalization on competition, selection, innovation
and growth. It also provides a detailed exploration of the channels of welfare gains generated
by all these trade-induced adjustments.
Effects of trade liberalization. As shown in (15), a reduction in trade costs reduces the
average markup 1/θx. This pro-competitive effect has several implications which we summarize
below.
Proposition 2 A reduction in τ triggers a reduction in the average markup θx, raises the
productivity cutoff z∗, reduces the number of operative varieties M , increases the growth rate g
and the R&D to sales ratio h
p(qd+qf )
.
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Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Figure 1 shows the selection effect. The reduction in the markup 1/θx shifts both equilibrium
conditions (EC) and (MC) to the right, thus leading to a higher cutoff z∗. Two mechanisms
contribute to the rise in growth, a direct growth effect that does not depend on firm selection
and an selection effect. We now derive the growth effect of trade liberalization and decompose
it into the direct and the selection effect. Before doing the decomposition, let us introduce the
following notation representing the right-hand-side of (MC)
mc(z∗, θx) =
1
nM(z∗) + ρˆ− λ
β + (1 + η)θx
.
It can be easily shown that the partial derivatives mc1 > 0 and mc2 < 0. Recall that equilibrium
e and z∗ are simultaneously determined by (EC) and (MC). At equilibrium, e and z∗ depend
on τ only through θx. The total derivative of g w.r.t. θx in (17) is
dg
dθx
= ηA
(
e+ θx
de
dθx
)
= ηA
(
e+ θxmc2
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct effect
+ ηAθxmc1
dz∗
dθx︸ ︷︷ ︸
selection effect
.
The direct effect is defined as the change of g that follows a change in θx, under the condition
that z∗ remains unchanged and consequently (EC) is not binding. In other words, it only
takes into account that e changes because the (MC) condition moves. Using the derivative of
mc(z∗, θx) w.r.t. θx, it is easy to show that
direct effect =
βe
β + (1 + η)θx
> 0.
The selection effect is the change of g induced by an increase in the cutoff productivity z∗
only. The selection effect is positive since as shown above mc1 > 0, and from Proposition 2,
dz∗/dθx > 0.
We now provide some intuition for these results. Although the number of firms in the global
economy is fixed at 2n, the reduction in the trade cost increases the penetration of foreign firms,
thereby making the domestic market more competitive. In a Cournot equilibrium, a reduction
in the markup raises produced quantities; from (16) the quantity produced is positively related
to θx. The increase in quantities is feasible since the homogeneous good becomes relatively more
expensive (i.e., the relative efficiency of the differentiated sector increases), and consumers’ de-
mand moves away from it towards the differentiated sector. Moreover, the increase in quantities
is also feasible because resources are freed by the reduction in trade costs. Since the benefits of
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cost-reducing innovation are increasing in the quantity produced, but the innovation cost does
not scale with production, the higher static efficiency associated with lower markups affects
positively innovation and growth. This direct effect of competition on growth can be found in
representative firm models of growth with endogenous market structure (see e.g. Peretto, 1996
and 2003, and Licandro and Navas-Ruiz, 2011).
The selection effect is specifically related to the heterogeneous firms structure of our model.
A reduction in the markup raises the cutoff z∗, thus forcing the least productive firms to exit
the market. Market shares are reallocated from exiting to surviving firms, thereby increasing
their market size and their incentive to innovate.
Welfare gains. We now decompose the welfare effects of trade into their different channels.
Following Melitz and Redding (2015), we compare the welfare effects of trade in the basic
model with those in a counterfactual economy where the selection margin is not operative.
This economy has the same initial equilibrium of the benchmark model, but changes in trade
costs do not affect z∗. Since our model features endogenous growth, we will also distinguish
between the static and the dynamic component of direct and selection gains from trade.
As pointed out by Atkeson and Burstein (2010), as long as love-for-variety matters, the
positive welfare effect of selection may be offset by the reduction in the mass of varieties
triggered by the same process. Since in our model the mass of potential entrants (1 −M) is
bounded above by one, selection always leads to a reduction in the mass of varieties, as can
be seen in (20). In the Melitz model and its dynamic versions in Atkeson and Burstein, the
mass of entrants can respond endogenously to changes in trade costs, potentially taming or
even offsetting the loss of varieties due to selection. Our modelling strategy does not allow this,
hence selection has a starker negative welfare effect through the loss of varieties.
Aggregate steady state welfare can be decomposed into four terms as follows
ρU =
1− α
α
ln
(
z¯M
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Productivity
+ ln(θdE)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Consumption diff.
+ β ln(βE)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Homogeneous good
+
ηg
ρ︸︷︷︸
Growth
. (21)
The first three components are static; the first two are associated to composite good consump-
tion. The first reflects the productivity gains due selection which increases average productivity
z¯ and the welfare losses due to less varieties M . The second is related to the consumption of
the differentiated good and to the oligopolistic distortions in this sector. Recall that θd = θx/A,
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combining the pro-competitive effect of trade with the cross-hauling effect, as measured by A.
The third component measures homogeneous good consumption utility. The last term repre-
sents the consumer surplus associated with sustained productivity growth in the differentiated
good sector.
Since, as shown above, both the direct and selection effects of trade on growth are positive,
a reduction in trade costs generates positive dynamic welfare gains from both channels. Are
static gains from trade positive as well? The direct static effect operates through θd e, with
e depending on θx.
12 From the discussion above concerning the direct growth effect of trade
liberalization, we know that θx e increases with θx. Indeed, θd = θx/A and A is hump-shaped,
being equal to one in the extreme cases of free trade, τ = 1, and prohibitive trade costs, τ = τ¯ ,
and for τ ∈ (1, τ¯) it is larger than one.13 Consequently, even if θx e is increasing with θx, trade
liberalization could reduce θd e at large values of τ .
Brander and Krugman (1983) show that the welfare gains from oligopoly trade without free
entry are ambiguous: trade produces gains through the reduction in markups which increases
consumer surplus. But there are also two opposite effects on producer surplus: foreign com-
petition reduces profits on domestic sales but increases profits on export sales. When trade
costs are high, there is little export and the negative effect of trade liberalization on domestic
profits dominates leading to lower producer surplus and welfare losses. Viceversa, when trade
costs are low, trade liberalization increases producer surplus yielding positive welfare gains.
Hence, welfare gains have a U-shape relationship with trade costs. Brander and Krugman
further show that introducing free entry the negative effect on producer surplus disappears,
and trade always increases welfare through the pro-competitive effect. Similarly, in our model
A is hump-shaped, implying that the direct gains θde = θxe/A can have an inverted U-shape
relationship with trade costs. In the next section we introduce free entry and show numerically
that welfare gains are positive for all feasible values of the trade cost.
Static welfare gains from selection operate through z¯, M and e, all depending on z∗. They
12The direct effect on total expenditure E and total expenditure per firm e are the same when z∗ is constant,
since the mass of varieties M is constant.
13To show that, notice that the sign of the partial derivative ∂A/∂τ is equal to the sign of
(1− n− α)(1 + τ)2 + 2(2n+ α− 1),
which has a zero at 1+τ =
√
2(2n+ α− 1)/ (n+ α− 1), for τ in the interval (1, n/(n+α−1)). A is increasing
before that maximum and decreasing after.
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can be decomposed into two sources, as can be seen by differentiating (21) with respect to z∗,
Static selection gains =
1− α
α
(
1
z¯
∂z¯
∂z∗
+
1
M
∂M
∂z∗
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Productivity/LFV
+ (1 + β)
(
1
e
∂e
∂M
+
1
M
)
∂M
∂z∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
Fixed cost
, (22)
after substituting E = nMe. ∂e/∂M is obtained by differentiating (MC), ∂M/∂z∗ by differen-
tiating (20) and ∂z¯/∂z∗ by differentiating the definition of z¯. Starting with the first component,
we see gains from selection-induced increases in the average productivity level. This component
also includes love for variety (LFV) losses, brought about by reductions in the mass of available
varieties. The second component represents the change in labor allocated to the production of
the differentiated good (excluding the fixed costs). Selection forces some firms out of the mar-
ket, thereby reducing the amount of resources needed to cover fixed production costs. These
resources are allocated to surviving firms, ultimately leading to more production and consump-
tion. The following proposition states conditions under which the static selection effects of
trade liberalization are always positive.
Proposition 3 Selection produces static welfare gains through the fixed cost channel. For
sufficiently small values of the exogenous death rate δ, the productivity/LFV trade-off results in
positive welfare gains as well.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
As shown in the Appendix, the fundamental reason for this result is that the productivity
effect is always positive and independent of δ, but the LFV effect is negative and increasing in δ.
There exists then a value of δ for which the LFV effect dominates. This parameter restriction
is in line with the literature assessing the welfare gains from selection, where the probability of
firm death is set to zero (e.g. Arkolakis et al 2012, and Melitz and Redding, 2014).
2 General model
This section adds a free entry condition to endogenously determine the number of firms per
variety, n, and a fixed export cost λx, removing the simplifying assumption that all firms export.
We assume that a potential entrant pays a sunk cost, φ > 0, that gives the right to produce one
and only one particular variety. For each new variety, firms enter until expected profits are zero,
implying that n is the same for all of them. Post-entry, if a variety is not productive enough to
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cover the fixed production costs λ, all n firms are exit together. Firms solve problem (9) as in
the simple model, but the presence of fixed export costs implies that only the most productive
firms export. Production and innovation decisions of exporters and non-exporters only differ in
the markup they face: non-exporters charge the autarky markup 1/θn, while exporters charge
on average 1/θx. With these differences in mind, we proceed to characterize equilibrium.
As shown in Appendix B, non-exporters and exporters’ demands for variable inputs are
z˜−ηt qn,t = θne
(
p¯
pn(z)
) α
1−α
(23)
z˜−ηt qx,t = θxe
(
p¯
px(z)
) α
1−α
, (24)
where qn,t, qx,t, and pn, px represent non-exporters and exporters production and detrended
prices, respectively. Prices follow (14) with θd = θn for non-exporters. The average detrended
price is
p¯
α
α−1 =
(∫ z∗x
z∗
pn(z)
α
α−1µ(z)dz +
∫ ∞
z∗x
px(z)
α
α−1µ(z)dz
)
.
Since prices are negatively related to productivity, as in the simple model, labor demand is
positively related to it. Notice that (24) becomes (16) when all firms are exporters; in this case,
all firms set the same markup implying that relative prices are equal to relative productivities.
In order to keep the model stationary, Dt in (5) is assumed to be
Dt =
θxe
(z˜ct )
−η yct
, (25)
where direct competitors production yc is equal to qcn for non-exporters and q
c
x for exporters.
This assumption is equivalent to the corresponding assumption in Section 2, where it can be
shown that the degree of difficulty D = θxe/(z˜
c
t )
−ηqct .
14 At equilibrium, (25) becomes
Dt =

θx
θn
(
p¯
pn
) α
α−1
if z∗ ≤ z ≤ z∗x(
p¯
px
) α
α−1
if z∗ > z∗x.
(26)
The difference with respect to Section 2 is the scale factor θx/θn, which jumps to one when z
crosses z∗. Notice that when all firms export, θn = θx and p¯/pn = p¯/px = z¯/z, as in the simple
model.
14By definition, D = Z˜/(z˜c)
ηˆ
, which becomes equal to z¯/zc. Using z˜−ηt qt = θxe z/z¯, Dt becomes θxe/(z˜
c
t )
−ηqct ,
which is equivalent to (25).
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The difficulty index in (25) makes innovation harder for more productive firms allowing,
as we show below, growth rates to be equal across varieties, a sufficient condition for the
productivity distribution to be stationary. Since in our model more productive firms are also
larger, we can interpret D both in terms of productivities (as we did in Section 2) or in terms of
size. Hence, we can think of D as measuring the distance between the labor size of the average
firm, θxe, and labor resources employed by firms producing variety z˜, i.e., (z˜
c
t )
−η yct . Larger
(more productive) firms face higher innovation difficulty than the average firm.
Using the new definition of the externality Dt, the growth rate of productivity is
g ≡
˙˜z
z˜
= ηAθxe− ρ− δ. (27)
Steady state R&D for exporters and non-exporters is
hx(z) =
(
p¯
px(z)
) α
1−α
(ηθxe− ρˆ) and hn(z) =
(
p¯
pn(z)
) α
1−α
(ηθxe− ρˆ) θn
θx
. (28)
Using the definition of px(z) and pn(z), we can immediately see that, as in the simple model,
more productive firms do more R&D. Moreover, exporters innovate more than non-exporters.
Due to different markups, exporters operate in more competitive markets allowing them to
obtain larger equilibrium size, which in turn, leads to more R&D expenditure.
The productivity cutoff for non-exporters is given by the zero profit condition, pi(z∗) = 0,
e =
λ
(
pn(z∗)
p¯
) α
1−α − ρˆ θn
θx
1− (1 + η) θn . (EC’)
The cutoff condition for exporters is determined setting pix(z
∗
x) = pˆix(z
∗
x), where pix(z) are total
profits of a firm operating in a traded product line z who sells to both markets, and pˆix(z)
are profits of a firm in the same line that decides to deviate by selling only domestically. The
export condition implies that, at equilibrium prices, no firm has incentives to deviate by not
exporting and saving the fixed export costs. In equilibrium the export condition is
e =
λx
(
px(z∗x)
p¯
) α
1−α
(1− (1 + η)θx)− (1− (1 + η)θd)
τ− θx
θd
τ−1
. (XC’)
Notice though, that since the average markup of exporters 1/θx is lower than that of deviating
firms 1/θd, it is possible that for some parameter combinations exporters total profits are zero
or negative for productivity levels above z∗. Hence, (XC’) pins down the export cutoff provided
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that total profits of the marginal exporter are non-negative. In the numerical solution that
follows, we use condition (XC’) to determine the export cutoff and check that the marginal
exporter makes always non-negative profits.
A firm entering the economy to produce a particular variety pays a fixed entry cost φ > 0
before observing the variety’s productivity. The number of competitors n is determined by a
free entry condition requiring (1− Γ(z∗)) p¯i/(ρ+ δ) = φ, where expected profits are given by
p¯i =
∫ z∗x
z∗
[
(pn(z)− z˜−η)qn − hn (z)− λ
]
µ(z)dz+
∫ ∞
z∗x
[
(px(z)− z˜−η)qx − hx (z)− λ− λx
]
µ(z)dz .
Using (23) and (24), the free entry condition can be written as
(
1− (1 + η) θ¯) e+ ρˆ θ¯
θx
− λ− 1− Γ(z
∗
x)
1− Γ(z∗)λx =
ρ+ δ
1− Γ(z∗)φ, (FE)
where
θ¯ = θn
∫ z∗x
z∗
(
p¯
pn(z)
) α
1−α
µ(z)dz + θx
∫ ∞
z∗x
(
p¯
px(z)
) α
1−α
µ(z)dz.
As in the simple model, the stationarity condition for the mass of firms M is determined by
(20). Finally, the labor market clearing condition∫ z∗x
z∗
(
z˜−ηqn + hn(z) + λ
)
µ(z)dz+
∫ ∞
z∗x
(
z˜−ηqx + hx(z) + λ+ λx
)
µ(z)dz+βe+
1−M(z∗)
M(z∗)
φ =
1
nM(z∗)
equals the labor resources used by domestic and exporting firms plus those devoted to entry,
(1−M(z∗))φ, to the labor endowment of the economy. From (20) and the definition of θ¯, the
market clearing condition can be written as
(
β + (1 + η) θ¯
)
e+
(
λ+
1− Γ(z∗x)
1− Γ(z∗)λx +
δ
1− Γ(z∗)φ
)
− ρˆ θ¯
θx
=
1 + δ/(1− Γ(z∗))
n
. (MC’)
A stationary equilibrium for this economy is a vector {z∗, z∗x, e, n} solving the system
(EC’)-(XC’)-(FE)-(MC’), with M(z∗) determined by (20).
3 Quantitative analysis
In this section, we first explore numerically the equilibrium properties of the generalized model.
Secondly, we compute the growth and welfare gains from trade, decomposing them in their static
and dynamic part, and highlighting the role of firm heterogeneity in shaping these gains.
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3.1 Calibration
We target the US economy, for which micro data are widely available. Consistent with the
evidence on firm size and productivity distribution, we assume that the entry distribution is
Pareto with shape parameter κ, and scale parameter zmin (see e.g. Axtell, 2001, and Luttmer,
2007).15 We have to calibrate 11 parameters (α, τ, δ, ρ, β, A, λ, λx, φ, κ, zmin). The discount
factor ρ is equal to the interest rate in steady state, following the business cycle literature we set
ρ = 0.02 which corresponds to an annual discount factor of about 98%. Using Census 2004 data,
we set δ = 0.09 to match the average enterprise annual death rate in manufacturing observed
in period 1998-2004. Rauch (1999) classifies goods into homogeneous and differentiated, and
finds that differentiated goods represent between 64.6 and 67.1 % of total US manufactures,
depending on the chosen aggregation scheme. We set β = 0.5 to get a share of differentiated
goods 1/ (1 + β) equal to 2/3. We normalize the minimum value of the productivity distribution
zmin to 1, without loss of generality.
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Parameters (α, τ, A, λ, λx, φ, κ) are jointly calibrated in order to match seven steady state
moments predicted by the model to the corresponding firm-level and aggregate statistics. We
target a productivity growth rate of 1.2% as reported by Corrado et al. (2009)17, a profit share of
national income of 25% (BEA)18, and an R&D to sales ratio of 2.4% from Compustat.19 Using
Census data for US manufacturing firms, Bernard et al. (2007) find that exporters account
for 18 % of manufacturing firms, and Bernard et al. (2003) report a standard deviation of
log firm productivity of 75%. We target these statistics, together with an import penetration
15In our economy very finely defined product lines have benchmark production technologies to which a few
active firms have access. An example of a product line could be smart phones. In this line a few top-end
powerful firms share the global market and operate with similar productivities. To get a sense of the empirical
mapping, the US NAICS industry classification finest sectoral disaggregation is at the 6-digit level. Our smart
phone example belongs to sector 334220, ”Radio and Television Broadcasting and Wireless Communications
Equipment Manufacturing”, the sector includes a large range of products from Airborne radios to cellular phones
(smart phones are not specified) to televisions (about 30 different and quite broadly defined types of products).
A product line in our model cannot be NAICS 334220, since we have a small number of firms (three or four
in the calibration) competing tightly in the production of highly substitutable goods: Iphone 6 competes with
Galaxy 5s, but not with Sony Home TV X. Hence, if we think about our product lines as sectors, there would
not be a clear empirical counterpart for them, not even at the 6-digit level. For this reason, we target the
distribution of firm productivity in the data.
16The role of parameter η is to guarantee 1− (1 + η)θ > 0, so that the profit function is always increasing in
productivity. We set it to an arbitrary small value such that this restriction is always satisfied.
17Since the model does not include tangible capital, investment in tangible capital must be subtracted from
total income in the data to compute labor productivity. After this adjustment, Corrado et al (2009) report an
average growth of labor productivity of about 1.2% a year in the period 1973-2003.
18This is the 2005-2015 average obtained from BEA NIPA data, where in line with our model we compute
national income as wages and salaries of private business plus corporate profits.
19This is the average R&D to sales ratio of Compustat firms in the period 1975-1995.
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Table 1: Calibration and model fit
Parameters taken from external sources
Parameters Value Interpretation Source
ρ 0.02 Interest rate standard
δ 0.09 Firms death rate Census, 2004
β 0.5 Share of differentiated goods Rauch, 1999
Calibrated parameters and model fit
Parameters Value Moment Data Model
Varieties substitutability, α 0.32 Productivity growth % 1.2 1.2
Pareto shape , κ 1.14 Markup avg. % 20 20
Innovation technology shifter, A 50 Share of exporters % 18 18
Fixed cost, domestic, λ 0.01 Import penetration ratio % 8.6 8.6
Fized cost, export, λx 0.0022 R&D to sales ratio % 2.4 2.1
Variable trade costs, τ 1.08 Std. firm productivity % 75 85
Sunk entry cost, φ 0.1 Profits/Income % 25 26
ratio (import share of output) of about 8.6 %, obtained from the World Bank Development
Indicators.20 Finally, the average markup is set to 20 %, an intermediate value in the range of
estimates reported in Basu (1996) and close to the median markup found in recent work by De
Loecker and Warzynski (2012).
Table 1 shows that the calibrated parameters deliver a fairly good model fit. The Pareto
shape parameter of productivity distribution estimated by Luttmer (2008) for US firms is 1.06.
Head et al. (2014) using French data for exporters to Belgium estimate a Pareto shape of
1.39. Our calibrated value for the Pareto shape lays in this range. The current empirical
literature provides a wide range of estimates for the elasticity of substitution between goods.
The “macro” elasticity between home and imported goods is in general smaller than the “micro”
elasticity between foreign sources of imports. Feenstra et al. (2014), find that the median micro
elasticity is 3.1, while the macro elasticity between home and imported goods is close to one.
Our benchmark calibration of α = 0.32 implies an elasticity of substitution 1.48, closer to the
macro estimates.21
20The data report total merchandise trade as a share of GDP. Consistent with our symmetric countries model,
we obtain the import share diving the total trade share by two. We target the average in the period 1980-2010.
21Note that the estimates in the literature are mostly derived from CES demand structure in monopolistic
competitive economies. In our oligopolistic economy, there is no variety trade, and domestic and foreign firms
compete head to head in the same product line. For this reason we decided to calibrate α internally, and not
relying on the wide range of elasticity estimates.
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3.2 Trade liberalization
We use the calibrated economy to simulate the steady state equilibrium response to changes
in the trade cost τ . More precisely, we analyze the response of product market competition,
selection, innovation, growth and welfare when the iceberg trade cost moves from one, the the-
oretical lower bound representing the absence of barriers, to the prohibitive trade cost22. Since
we are doing steady state comparison, the welfare gains that we compute must be interpreted
as gains from comparing the welfare of two global economies similar in all features except for
the trade cost. Figure 2 shows the results.
Figure 2 shows that trade liberalization has a pro-competitive effect on both exporters and
non-exporters. The pro-competitive effect results, from an increase in import competition in-
duced by the reduction in trade costs, as well as from the increase in the number of domestic
firms n. Exporters experience a markup reduction on their domestic sales, 1/θd, due to increas-
ing foreign competition, and an increase in the markup on export sales, 1/θf , due to the drop in
the variable export cost.23 Notice also that although exporting firms experience an increase in
their export markup this is not strong enough to offset the reduction in their domestic markup,
therefore the average markup of exporters declines with trade liberalization. In the simple
model we have proved that the average markup of exporting firms 1/θx falls with a reduction
in trade costs. The numerical simulations in Figure 2 show that the two models qualitatively
predict similar pro-competitive effects on exporters.
The reduction in the domestic markup of exporters and the increase in their export markup
encourage more firms to start exporting and, as a consequence, the export cutoff z∗x decreases
when τ declines and goes to infinite when the trade cost approaches its prohibitive level. In
order to provide a clear image of this effect, we first show in panel four the export cutoff from
free trade τ = 1 to τ = 1.13, then in panel five we show the cutoff from τ = 1.13 onwards.
A pro-competitive effect is also experienced by non-exporting firms, although the markup for
non-traded varieties 1/θn is not directly affected by changes in trade costs. The drop in the
markup of non-exporting firms is generated by the increases in the number of firms per variety
n. Similarly to Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), the endogenous market structure of our model
22We stop at τ = 1.2, slightly before the prohibitive trade cost because at τ¯ the export cutoff shoots to infinite
and the numerical solution breaks down. At τ = 1.2, the economy is essentially closed, since export is less than
0.2 percent of GDP. In the rest of the paper, for brevity, we refer to τ = 1.2 as the prohibitive tariff.
23In the first panel of Figure 2 corresponding to the markups of traded varieties, the left scale refers to the
export markup and the right scale for the domestic markup. Both markups are equal at τ = 1.
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Figure 2: Trade liberalization
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implies that trade liberalization has a positive effect on firms’ production that outweighs the
direct competition effect on prices and markups and allows surviving firms to be bigger, sell
more, and earn higher profits on average. Hence, expected profits are larger in a more open
economy, and this leads a larger number of firms to enter the market. The reduction in markups
for non-exporting firms triggers selection, forcing the less productive domestic firms out of the
market, as can be seen from the increase in the domestic cutoff z∗.
In the baseline model, more productive firms are larger and since innovation scales with
firm size, larger firms innovate more. In this generalized framework, exporters are larger and
more productive than non-exporters, hence, as suggested by equilibrium conditions (28), they
allocate more resources to innovation activities. As the trade cost falls, more firms enter
the export market, thereby experiencing a boost in their size and increasing their innovation
efforts.24 Figure 2 shows that trade liberalization increases aggregate innovation of exporters
but not that of domestic firms. For very high trade cost the aggregate innovation of exporters is
lower than that of non-exporters since very few firms export. As the trade cost falls and more
firms export, innovation by exporters increases and innovation by domestic firms declines.
Innovation by domestic firms declines because selection reduces the mass of non-exporters
and the most productive among them enter the export market. Finally, aggregate innovation
increases thereby raising the economy’s productivity growth rate, as we can see in panel eight.
In order to provide a measure of the volume of trade produced by different levels of the
trade cost, in Figure 2 we also report the import penetration ratio. Moving from τ¯ = 1.2 to
no variable trade costs, generates a substantial change in the volume of trade, with the import
penetration ratio being about 17% at τ = 1. Notice also that the absolute elasticity of trade
to the trade cost varies massively for different levels of τ ; it is extremely high at autarky and
substantially lower close to free trade. Variable trade elasticity will prove important in shaping
the selection welfare gains from trade, as we will discuss later. For the moment it suffices to
notice that that trade liberalization has a positive effect on welfare. As in the simple model,
welfare effects are both static and dynamic, and they originate directly through intensive margin
of adjustment, and indirectly through trade-induced selection margins. In the next section we
break down the various sources of gains from trade and explore the economic forces governing
them.
24To illustrate this effect, in Appendix C Figure 6 we show that the ratio between the innovation of the
marginal exporter and that of the marginal non-exporter triples when moving from autarky to free trade.
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Trade, markups and innovation: empirical evidence. Before moving to the channels of
welfare gains from trade we discuss the empirical evidence in support of our model predictions.
Trade and markups. There is a large literature documenting pro-competitive effects of trade.
Harrison (1994) finds robust negative effects on firm-level profit margins of a large trade reform
in Cote d’Ivoire implemented in 1995. She also shows that accounting for the effects of trade
on product market competition leads to larger positive effects of trade on the growth rate
of firm productivity. Levinsohn (1993), using firm-level Turkish data, finds evidence of pro-
competitive effects associated to a trade liberalization reform in 1984. More recently, Feenstra
and Weinstein (2016) find a substantial reduction in average markups in the US between 1992
and 2005 associated to a large increase in import shares. De Loecker et al. (2016), find
that Indian firms do not entirely pass the cost reduction due to input tariff reduction in the
period 1989-2003 to consumers. This happens because they cash in the lower costs by increasing
markups. This mechanism is similar to what we observe in our model. Although we do not have
trade in intermediate goods, in our economy trade reduces the cost of reaching foreign markets,
and firms use some of the cost reduction to increase their export markup. Moreover, when
focusing on changes in final goods tariffs De Loecker et al. (2016) find that trade liberalization
has a negative effect on total markups of exporting firms, similarly to what our model suggests.
Trade, selection and innovation. There is a growing empirical literature documenting the
effects of trade on selection and innovation. Bloom et al. (2016), using a new data set of
firms across twelve European countries find that import competition from China, led to faster
technological change along several dimensions, including patenting, IT intensity and TFP.
Bustos (2010) studies the impact of a large regional trade agreement, MERCOSUR, on a
measure of firm-level innovation which includes R&D, spending for technology transfer, and
capital goods that embody new technologies. She finds that increase in revenues generated by
tariff reductions lead exporters to innovate more. In line with this results, in our model trade
increases innovation only among exporters.
Trade, markups, and innovation/growth. Griffith et al. (2010), using European sector-level
data, find that the EU Single Market Programme (SMP), a large program deregulating the
product market which also includes reductions in trade barriers, is associated with increased
product market competition, as measured by a reduction in average profitability, and with a
subsequent increase in innovation intensity and productivity growth. Aghion et al. (2009)
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using firm-level UK data, find that incumbent productivity growth and patenting in UK firms
is positively correlated with foreign firms’ entry in technologically advanced industries. This
technologically advanced industries are those where foreign and domestic firms are more neck-
and-neck, that is they have similar levels of technology and market shares.
3.3 Growth and welfare gains from trade
In this section we quantify the welfare gains from trade and decompose them into their different
sources. First, we decompose welfare gains into their static and dynamic parts highlighting the
role of productivity growth. Second, we explore the role of firm heterogeneity decomposing
growth and welfare gains from trade into their direct and selection components.
Static and dynamic gains. Welfare gains of moving from autarky to trade are quantified
with a consumption compensating variation measure. Let us denote consumption at time t by
Ωt = {Xt, Y }, Xt growing at the rate ηg and Y constant, and any (balanced growth) equilibrium
consumption path, for t ∈ (0,∞), by Ω. Moreover, we label ΩA the stationary consumption
path in autarky and Ωτ the stationary consumption path in a trade equilibrium with τ ∈ (1, τ¯)
(notice that ΩA = Ωτ¯ ). Welfare can then be denoted by U i(Ωi), i = {A, τ}, representing the
value of the discounted utility flow resulting from substituting the equilibrium path Ωi in the
welfare function (1). Consequently,
ρU i(Ωi) = ρ
∞∫
0
(lnX it + β lnY
i) e−ρt dt
= lnX i0 + β lnY
i︸ ︷︷ ︸
Static
+
ηgi
ρ︸︷︷︸
Dynamic
.
In order to make the welfare of the autarky and trade balanced growth path equilibria com-
parable, we assume that the entry distribution at time t = 0 is the same for both economies
and we make it equal to the stationary entry distribution Γ(z) (recall that by definition of z,
z = z˜0). Any welfare difference will be then due to differences in trade costs, selection and
growth performance.
Let us define the compensating variation measure ω, ω ∈ <+, such that UA(ωΩA) = U τ (Ωτ ),
for any τ ∈ (1, τ¯). It can be easily shown that
log(ω) =
ρ
1 + β
(
U τ (Ωτ )− UA(ΩA)) .
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This measures the percentage gains in terms of lifetime consumption of comparing the trade
economy with the autarkic economy. The growth contribution to these gains can be written as
log(ωg) =
η
(1 + β) ρ
(
gτ − gA) . (29)
The static gains can be obtained as a residual subtracting ωg from the total gains ω. In Table
(2) we report the quantitative effects of moving from autarky to the benchmark trade cost.
Table 2: Gains from trade
Trade Autarky % Change
Avg. markup (%) 20 28 −28.5
Avg. productivity 4.04 3.02 33
Growth (%) 1.24 0.79 57
Total Dynamic Static
Welfare gains 50.0 25.6 24.4
Moving from autarky to the benchmark economy trade level the average markup drops by
about 29% and productivity increases by 33%. The annual growth in autarky is 0.79% while
under trade it goes up to 1.24%, a 57% increase. The last row shows the welfare gains and
its decomposition into static and dynamic gains according to (29). Moving from autarky to
the benchmark import penetration ratio increases welfare by 50%, about half of this increase
is attributable to trade-induced productivity growth.
Figure 3 reports the decomposition of the gains of moving from autarky to all levels of trade
costs. The first panel reports welfare gains. Not surprisingly, gains are increasing in the size
of liberalization, with the dynamic gains rising more steeply than static gains. Although the
main scope of the paper is to explore the structure of the gains from trade assessing the role of
productivity dynamics as an additional source, it is worth noticing that the absolute size of the
total gains from trade is quite large. Perla et al. (2016) show that in their dynamic economy
moving from autarky to a 23% total trade share leads to a 24% increases in welfare. This entire
increase is due to static gains, while the potential gains coming from trade-induced growth are
offset by the decline of product variety due to selection, as in Atkeson and Burstein (2010), and
reallocation of labor away from production. The size of our static gains is similar to theirs but
in our model trade generates large dynamic gains that are not completely offset by the loss of
variety due to selection.
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Figure 3: Static and dynamic gains from trade
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The second panel of Figure 3 reports the ratio of the overall welfare gains to the static gains
for different levels of the trade cost, thus measuring the proportional increase in gains due to
productivity growth. Starting from the benchmark calibration of the trade cost, in line with
Table 2, the total gains are about two times higher than those obtainable in an economy with
only static gains. Starting from a higher initial trade cost, the ratio declines but total gains are
still substantially higher then static gains, about 40% higher close to autarky. In line with our
results, but in a model where productivity growth is driven by knowledge diffusion at the entry
stage and not by innovation, Sampson (2016) finds that ‘dynamic’ selection leads to welfare
gains from trade at least three times those obtainable in heterogeneous firms’ economies with
static steady states. Finally, Figure 3 reports the ratio between growth under costly trade and
autarky, showing that growth is about 57% higher at the benchmark trade cost compared to
autarky, and always robustly higher at all other levels of the trade cost. Similar results are
obtained in Perla et al. (2016), while the growth rate increases by about 25% in Sampson
(2016) when the import penetration ratio goes from zero to 10%.
Direct and selection effects. We now decompose the gains from trade into direct gains,
which do not depend on selection, and selection gains hinging on the reallocation of market
shares from low to high productive firms. Following Melitz and Redding (2015), and in line
with our decomposition in the simple model, we construct a counterfactual economy where
the growth rate, welfare, the import penetration ratio, the share of exporting firms, and the
average productivity of exporters and non-exporters are the same as in our benchmark economy;
essentially, the two economies have the same equilibrium at the benchmark trade cost. We then
compute the gains from trade in this economy shutting down the extensive margins, that is we
do not let the cutoffs z∗ and z∗x respond to changes in the trade cost. This allows us to isolate
the direct gains from trade, and compute the contribution of selection comparing these gains
to those obtained in the benchmark model.
In first panel in Figure 4, we compare the welfare gains obtained in the benchmark model
with the direct gains obtained in the model without selection. We can see that selection
generates total gains of moving from the benchmark trade cost to autarky that are over 10
times larger than the direct gains. Moreover, the dynamic gains in the benchmark model are
about 5 time larger than those generated shutting down selection. Figure 7 in the appendix
shows that shutting down selection leads to small growth gains: growth at the calibrated trade
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Figure 4: Direct and selection growth and welfare gains
cost is only 8% higher than in autarky, strikingly lower that the 57% difference obtained in
the benchmark model. Moreover, welfare gains are just about 4.5%, way below the 50% gains
obtained in the benchmark model.
Why are the selection gains from trade higher than those generated by a model where the
extensive margins of exit, entry and exporting are shut down? Arkolakis et al. (2012) show
that in a large class of models satisfying three macro-level restrictions the gains from trade are
pinned down by two sufficient statistics, the domestic trade share and the trade elasticity, and
they do not depend on the different micro-specifications of the model. These restrictions are: 1)
balanced trade; 2) aggregate profits are a constant share of aggregate revenues; 3) CES demand
system with a constant elasticity of trade with respect to variable trade costs. They show that
the standard Melitz (2003) model with unbounded Pareto distribution of productivity satisfies
these restrictions. As a consequence, the welfare gains from a given increase in the domestic
trade share in this model are identical to those obtained in a version of the model without firm
heterogeneity, such as Krugman (1980). Melitz and Redding (2015) find that small variations
from these restrictions imply that the trade elasticity is not constant and therefore it is not a
sufficient statistics for welfare. They show that replacing unbounded Pareto with a bounded
Pareto distribution, CES demand does not yield constant trade elasticity and the welfare gains
generated by a model with firm heterogeneity are arbitrarily larger than those obtainable with
homogeneous firms.
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The class of models considered in Arkolakis et al. (2012) features either perfect or mo-
nopolistic competition, hence our oligopolistic economy is outside that class and violates both
restrictions 2) and 3). Figure 2 shows that the elasticity of trade to trade cost varies massively
at different levels of openness. Moreover, in Figure 4 we see that trade elasticity also varies
across models. Precisely, the elasticity in the benchmark model is higher than that in the model
where the selection margins have been shut down, and this difference is increasing the closer
we are to autarky. This suggests that, similarly to Melitz and Redding (2015), in our economy
variable trade elasticity generates different gains in models with and without extensive mar-
gins. Notice however, that differently from the monopolistic competitive environment of the
standard Melitz model considered by Melitz and Redding, in our oligopolistic market structure
trade elasticity is not constant even with unbounded Pareto. Head et al. (2015) show that
the new gains from trade due to selection can be substantially larger if instead of using an
unbounded Pareto the model is calibrated using a log-normal distribution of firm productiv-
ity. The reason is that the log-normal delivers variable trade elasticity. Our results show that
under oligopoly variable trade elasticity and large gains from selection can be obtained even
calibrating the model with the typical unbounded Pareto.
We can draw three conclusions from these experiments. First, economies with oligopoly
trade feature variable trade elasticity and generate new gains from trade-induced selection not
obtainable in models with homogeneous firms. Second, innovation-driven productivity growth
increases the gains from trade originating from firm selection substantially. Hence, performing
welfare analysis in models with static steady-state productivity, such as Melitz (2003), may lead
to underestimating gains from trade. Third, abstracting from firm heterogeneity, the previous
generation of trade and growth models, such as Grossman and Helpman (1991), and Peretto
(2003), are likely to largely underestimate the growth and welfare gains from trade.
Robustness. Next, we explore the robustness of these results to a wide range of parameters’
specifications different from our benchmark calibration. Precisely, we compute the total gains,
the ratio of total to static gains, the relative growth rate, and the direct gains of moving from the
benchmark trade cost to autarky, changing one parameter at the time away from its calibrated
value.25 Table (3) show the results and Tables A.1 and A.2 report how the deviations from
25Since changing parameters affects the value of the prohibitive trade cost τ¯ which defines the autarky state
of the economy, in computing the welfare gains we take this into account and use the appropriate prohibitive
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the calibrated parameters affect the moments targeted in the calibration. This allows us to
check both the difference in welfare gains and in moment matching generated by parameters’
departure from the benchmark calibration.
Table (3) shows that total gains are substantially above static gains, suggesting that the
sizable contribution of productivity dynamics found in the benchmark calibration is sufficiently
robust. Not surprisingly, the level of total gains and the ratio of total over static gains is low
for higher levels of the discount factor ρ and low levels of the innovation efficiency parameter A.
High discount rate implies that consumers care less about future growth and, as a consequence,
the impact of growth on their lifetime consumption is lower. Low efficiency of the innovation
technology implies lower returns innovation, lower equilibrium growth, and larger share of
labor needed to keep the economy growing. Although trade increases growth more under low
innovation efficiency, due to its lower level growth is a smaller component of welfare and comes
at a higher cost, since it diverts more resources away from production. It follows that both the
total gains and their dynamic component are lower the lower innovation efficiency is.
Table 3: Robustness
Bench ρ = .01 ρ = .05 A = 30 A = 120 α = .1 α = .5
Total welfare gains 0.50 0.85 0.30 0.40 0.95 0.33 0.44
Total/static welfare gains 2.04 4.45 1.26 1.55 4.22 1.23 18.0
Trade/autarky growth 1.57 1.61 1.41 1.72 1.50 1.15 1.72
Total/direct gains 12.1 8.57 25.8 18.7 8.46 12.3 11.0
β = .25 β = .75 φ = .05 φ = .2
Total welfare gains 0.50 0.70 0.38 0.44 0.58
Total/static welfare gains 2.04 2.17 1.97 22.1 1.17
Trade/autarky growth 1.57 1.60 1.56 1.61 1.26
Total/direct gains 12.1 13.9 9.45 29.1 10.6
Higher demand elasticity (higher α) increases the dynamic gains from trade. Higher sub-
stitutability across varieties implies stronger intensive margin of reallocation. More elastic
demand generates larger growth effects of trade, thereby magnifying the dynamic component
of the welfare gains at the expenses of the static component. Moreover, a more reactive inten-
sive margin reduces the contribution of selection to the gains from trade. A higher share of the
differentiated good in the economy (lower β) increases total gains and the share of total over
static gains. Intuitively, the larger the weight of the differentiated sector in consumer utility
cost τ¯ for each departure from the benchmark calibration.
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Figure 5: Firm heterogeneity and welfare gains
the stronger the selection effects of trade.
Notice also that in all these different scenarios the total gains from trade obtainable with
our heterogeneous firms economy are substantially higher than the direct gains, obtained in a
version of our economy where the selection margins have been shut down. This suggests that
firm selection has an important role in generating additional welfare gains.
Since our initial productivity distribution is an untruncated Pareto, the degree of hetero-
geneity is summarized only by the shape parameter κ. The homogeneous firm model corre-
sponds to the limit case in which the κ → ∞. Following Melitz and Redding (2015), we can
study the role of firm heterogeneity showing how welfare gains change as we move from the
benchmark economy toward an economy with less firm heterogeneity. This yields a continuous
comparative statics with respect to the degree of firm heterogeneity. In Figure (5) we perform
a wider robustness on the role of firm heterogeneity in shaping the gains from trade and its
composition. As for the robustness analysis above, the welfare gains are computed comparing
autarky with the benchmark trade cost.
The results show that less heterogeneity, higher values of κ, is associated with lower total
gains and lower ratio of total to static gains. Intuitively, the lower the degree of firm heterogene-
ity, the lower the scope for the selection margin in generating trade-induced reallocations and
welfare gains. The total welfare gains decrease substantially as the degree of firm heterogeneity
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declines. Interestingly, a lower degree of heterogeneity among firms affects the dynamic gains
more than the static gains. In fact, as the Pareto shape increases the ratio between the total
and static gains tends to one. This is because the growth effect of trade declines substantially at
lower degrees of firm heterogeneity. As shown in the second panel, growth is about 57% higher
under trade than in autarky in the benchmark economy (κ = 1.14) and only 3% higher when
the Pareto shape increases to κ = 2. Moreover, Table A.2 shows that at κ = 2 equilibrium
growth is almost zero, and consequently the contribution of productivity dynamics to the gains
from trade becomes negligible.
4 Discussion
In this section, we dig deeper into the role of endogenous markups in driving the quantitative
results shown above. We show that in the general model, the presence of markup dispersion is
necessary for our oligopolistic economy with free entry to generate trade-induced selection. We
develop our argument in two stages. We start showing that trade does not generate selection in
the simple model of Section 2 if we allow the number of firm per product line to be endogenously
determined by the free entry condition, but we keep the assumption that all firms export. This
result echoes the neutrality result in Atkeson and Burstein (2010). We then move to the general
model where the number of firms is endogenous, only the most productive firms export, and
markups for exporters and non-exporters are different, and show that the selection effect of
trade reappears.
The absence in Atkeson and Burstein (2010) of selection gains from trade is fundamentally
due to the role played by the free entry condition, which by shrinking the mass of operative
varieties generates welfare losses which offset the gains. We show below that the free entry
condition plays a similar and even more extreme role in our simple model. This can be easily
seen by adding the free entry condition to the simple model of Section 2.26 Notice that, when
all varieties are traded, the free entry condition becomes
[1− (1 + η)θx] e+ ρˆ− λ = ρ+ δ
1− Γ(z∗)φ
where the left-hand-side represents the average profit at entry. Combining this with the exit
26Free entry is introduced to endogenize the number of firms. An equivalent conclusion would be reached if
the number of firms remains constant, but the the mass of varieties is determined by the free entry condition,
as in Atkeson and Burstein.
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condition (EC) and rearranging terms, we obtain
z¯(z∗)
z∗
λ = λ+
ρ+ δ
1− Γ(z∗)φ, (30)
which determines z∗ independently of θx and, consequently, independently of the iceberg trade
cost τ . Hence, changes in trade costs do not affect selection and cannot have any welfare effect
through the selection channel. This result can be easily understood in terms of arbitrage. In-
cumbent firms face two alternatives: operating their current technology or exiting and entering
again by paying the fixed entry cost and drawing a new productivity level. This trade-off is
represented in (30), which combines the entry and exit conditions. Since both exiting and
entering firms face the same markup, arbitrage makes the marginal firm indifferent to markup
changes and, consequently, to changes in trade costs.
While in the simple model the markup is the same for all firms, the general model features
exporting firms charging lower markups than non-exporters, as shown in (23) and (24). Hence,
entering and exiting firms face different profit opportunities. As can be seen by comparing
the free entry condition (FE) and the exit condition (EC
′
), the marginal firm is not indifferent
anymore to changes in profits induced by trade liberalization, and the entry/exit arbitrage does
not imply that selection is independent of the markup. It follows that free entry does no shut
down the selection effect of trade which, as shown in Table 2, yields positive welfare gains.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have built a rich model of oligopoly trade featuring heterogeneous firms,
endogenous markups, and innovation-driven growth, to identify and quantify different sources
of welfare gains from trade. We have shown that trade increases product market competition
by reducing markups, thereby triggering firm selection and productivity growth. Trade leads
to substantial welfare gains, about half of which are accounted for by the effect of selection on
productivity growth. Dynamic gains due to the growth effects of trade double the welfare gains
obtainable in a static version of our economy.
In the current debate on the new welfare gains from trade due to firms selection, it has been
shown that monopolistically competitive economies with firm heterogeneity do not produce
new gains if firms draw their productivity from an unbounded Pareto distribution (Arkolakis
et al. 2010, Melitz and Redding, 2015). We have shown that under an oligopolistic economy
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with endogenous productivity growth, trade-induced selection has first order effects on welfare
even with unbounded Pareto productivity distribution.
Since introducing free entry is a notable challenge in general equilibrium models of oligopoly
trade, we have considered a simple entry strategy that only generates markup differences be-
tween exporters and non-exporters. This is a limitation of the model and a challenge for future
research would be to generalize the model to a full distribution of markups across heterogeneous
firms. In an ongoing project, Impullitti, Licandro, and Rendahl (2016), we are generalizing a
static version of the model along this and other dimensions.
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A Simple model: derivations and proofs
A.1 Firm problem
The n identical firms competing in the production of each variety j play a dynamic Cournot
game. They behave non-cooperatively and maximize the expected present value of their net
cash flow, denoted by Vijs for firm i producing variety j at time s. This differential game is solved
focusing on Nash Equilibrium in open loop strategies. Let aijt = (qijt, hijt), t ≥ s, be a strategy
for firm i producing j at time t. Let us denote by aij firm i’s strategy path for quantities and
innovation. At time s a vector of strategies (a1j, ...., aij, ......, anj) is an equilibrium in market j
if
Vijs(a1j, ...., aij, ......, anj) ≥ Vijs(a1j, ...., a′ij, ......, anj) ≥ 0,
for all firms {1, 2, ..., n}, where in (a1j, ...., a′ij, ......, anj) only firm i deviates from the equilibrium
path. The first inequality states that firm i maximizes its value taking the strategy paths of
the others as given, and the second requires firm i’s value to be positive.27
Each domestic firm solves the dynamic problem (9). Writing down the current-value Hamilto-
nian and computing the first order conditions, assuming symmetry xd,t = xf,t = xt, Ed,t = Ef,t =
Et, Xd,t = Xf,t = Xt, pd,t = pf,t = pt, yields[
(α− 1) qd,t
xt
+ 1
]
pt = z˜
−η
t , (31)[
(α− 1) qf,t
xt
+ 1
]
pt = τ z˜
−η
t , (32)
1 = vtAkt, (33)
ηz˜−η−1t
vt
(qd,t + τqf,t) =
− ·vt
vt
+ ρ+ δ, (34)
where vt is the costate variable. Add (31) and (32) and use qd,t/xt + qf,t/xt = 1/n to obtain
pt =
z˜−ηt
θd
=
τ z˜−ηt
θf
,
27The open loop equilibrium allows for a close-form solution. The drawback of focusing on the open loop
equilibrium is that it does not generally have the property of subgame perfection, as firms choose their optimal
time-paths strategies at the initial time and stick to them forever. In closed loop equilibria, instead, firms do
not pre-commit to any path and their strategies at any time depend on the whole past history. The Nash
equilibrium in this case is strongly time-consistent and therefore sub-game perfect. Unfortunately, closed loop
or feedback equilibria generally do not allow for a closed form solution and often they do not allow for a solution
at all. The literature on differential games has uncovered classes of games in which the open loop equilibrium
degenerates into a closed loop and therefore is subgame perfect (e.g. Reingaum, 1982, Fershtman, 1987, and
Cellini and Lambertini, 2005). A sufficient condition for the open loop Nash equilibrium to be subgame perfect
is that the state variables of other firms do not appear in the first order conditions for each firm.
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θd =
2n− 1 + α
n (1 + τ)
and θf = τθd
where θd and θf are the inverse of the markups charged in the domestic and export markets,
respectively. Substitute them in the inverse demand function (8) to get
z˜−ηt = θd
Et
Xαt
xα−1t .
Multiply both sides of the above equation by qx,t, to obtain
qx,tz˜
−η
t =
qx,t
xt
θdE
(
xt
Xt
)α
.
Substituting xt =
(
z˜−ηt (X
α
t /θdEt)
) 1
α−1
into equation (2) leads to (xt/Xt)
α = z/(Mz¯). Finally,
use the definition of A to derive equation (16).
Substitute (5) into the FOCs (12) to get vt = (Akt)
−1 = (ADtz˜t)−1, then substitute this into
(13) and use the definition Dt = Z˜t/(z˜
c
t )
ηˆ = z¯/z to obtain the growth rate in (17). From the
innovation technology we then obtain
h =
g
A
z
z¯
= (ηθxe− ρˆ) z
z¯
.
Finally, the productivity cutoff is determined by solving the zero profit condition
pi(z˜∗) =
(
pt − z˜∗−ηt
)
qd,t +
(
pt − τ z˜∗−ηt
)
qf,t − h− λ = 0.
Use pt = 1/ (θdz˜
η
t ) and h above to obtain
1
θd
qd,t + qf,t
z˜∗ηt
−
(
qd,t + τqf,t
z˜∗ηt
)
(1 + η) + ρˆ
z
z¯
− λ = 0.
Substitute the definition of A and use (16) to obtain the (EC) condition
[1− (1 + η) θx] e z∗/z¯ + ρˆ z∗/z¯ − λ = 0.
A.2 Equilibrium existence and trade liberalization
Proposition 1. Since M is decreasing in z∗, the (MC) locus is increasing from
(1+δ)
n
+ ρˆ− λ
β + (1 + η)θx
,
to infinity, for z∗ ≥ zmin. Under Assumption 1(a), the (EC) locus is decreasing, starting at
λ z¯e
zmin
− ρˆ
1− (1 + η)θx ,
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for z∗ = zmin, and going to
(
λ− (ρ+ δ)/A)/(1− (1+η)θx) when z∗ goes to∞. Assumption 1.b
implies Ψ < 1 and substituting this into 1.c leads to 1+η < 1/θx, which guarantees that profits
are increasing in productivity z. Since Ψ < 1 it is easy to show that 1.c is a sufficient condition
for the intercept of the (EC) locus to be larger than that of the (MC) locus at z∗ = zmin, which
implies single-crossing of the two equilibrium conditions.
Proposition 2. Figure 1 shows the effect of an increase in the degree of competition (reduction
in the markup 1/θx) on the equilibrium values of z
∗ and e. An increase in θx shifts both the
(EC) and the (MC) curves to the right, thereby increasing the equilibrium productivity cutoff
z∗. Depending on the relative strengths of the shift of the two curves e can increase or decrease,
but the average growth rate g always increases. To see that, notice that from (17) the effect on
g of a change in θx is determined by its effect on θxe. Multiplying the market clearing condition
(MC) by θx, we obtain θxe as a function of θx and M(z
∗), and since in equilibrium M(z∗) is
decreasing in θx, we can conclude that θxe is increasing in θx.
Finally, notice that the R&D to sales ratio reads
ht
pt(qd,t + qf,t)
=
(ηθxe− ρˆ)z/z¯
z˜−ηt (qd,t + τqf,t)/θx
=
(ηθxe− ρˆ)z/z¯
θxe z/z¯
θx =
(
η − ρˆ
θxe
)
θx.
Since, as shown just above, θxe is increasing in θx, the R&D to sales ratio is increasing too.
A.3 Welfare
Pro-competitive effect. Differentiate θx with respect to τ
∂θx
∂τ
= −2(τ − 1) (2n− 1 + α)
2
n (1 + τ)3 (1− α) ≤ 0,
to see that trade liberalization reduces markups. In open economy, optimal quantities consumed
in the domestic and foreign markets are
qd,t =
(
1− 1
z˜ηt pt
)
xt
1− α and qf,t =
(
1− τ
z˜ηt pt
)
xt
1− α,
respectively. Multiply both sides of both equations above by n, add up right and left-hand side
terms, and finally substitute pt using the inverse demand function and xt with n(qd,t + qf,t) to
get
x1−αt = θd
E
Xαt
z˜ηt .
Substitute xt in (2) and use the definition of average productivity z¯ to get
Xt = (z¯M)
1−α
α θdE e
ηgt.
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Substitute it into the discounted utility (1), integrate and use (6) to get
ρU = ρ
∞∫
0
(lnXt + β lnYt) e
−ρt dt
=
1− α
α
ln(z¯M) + ln(θdnMe) + β ln(βnMe) +
ηg
ρ
.
Let us now sign the different components of the static welfare effects of selection in (22).
Differentiate the definition of z¯ and divide it by z¯ itself, to get the productivity effect
1
z¯
∂z¯
∂z∗
=
z¯ − z∗
z¯
f(z∗)
1− Γ(z∗) > 0.
Differentiate (20) and divide it by M , to get the LFV effect
1
M
∂M
∂z∗
= − δ
1 + δ − Γ(z∗)
f(z∗)
1− Γ(z∗) < 0.
Notice that δ/ (1 + δ − Γ(z∗)) is strictly increasing in δ. Differentiate (MC) to get
∂e
∂M
= − 1
[β + (1 + η)θx]nM2
< 0.
Given that ∂M/∂z∗ < 0, the sign of the fixed cost component in (22) is the opposite of the
sign of
1
e
∂e
∂M
+
1
M
=
1
M
− 1
[β + (1 + η)θx]nM2e
=
(ρˆ− λ)n
(ρˆ− λ)nM + 1 ,
which is strictly negative since ρˆ < λ by Assumption 1 (b). The last term results from using
(MC) to substitute for e. Finally, the productivity/LFV trade off in (22) can be written as
1
z¯
∂z¯
∂z∗
+
1
M
∂M
∂z∗
=
f(z∗)
1− Γ(z∗)
(
z¯ − z∗
z¯
− δ
1 + δ − Γ(z∗)
)
,
which is positive iff
δ <
z¯ − z∗
z∗
(
1− Γ(z∗)).
This is consistent with the fact that the productivity effect does not depend on δ and the
(absolute value of the) LVF effect is increasing in δ.
B General model: derivations and proofs
Variable costs. From equation (8), demands for non-exported and exported varieties read
xn(z) =
(
E
pn(z)Xα
) 1
1−α
and xx(z) =
(
E
px(z)Xα
) 1
1−α
,
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where xi and pi, i ∈ {n, x}, represent quantities and prices of non-exported and exported
varieties. Substitute them into (2) to get
X =
E
p¯
M
1−α
α (35)
where
p¯
α
α−1 =
(∫ z∗x
z∗
pn(z)
α
α−1µ(z)dz +
∫ ∞
z∗x
px(z)
α
α−1µ(z)dz
)
.
Notice that p¯M
α−1
α is the average price of the composite good, which is equal to the average
price of intermediary inputs times the inverse of the love-for-variety externality. Substitute now
X in the demand functions and multiply both sides by the corresponding price to get (we omit
argument z to simplify notation)
pnxn =
E
M
(
p¯
pn
) α
1−α
and pxxx =
E
M
(
p¯
px
) α
1−α
.
For non-exported varieties, use xn = nqn and the price equation (14) to get
z˜−ηqn = θne
(
p¯
pn
) α
1−α
.
For exported varieties, from the price equation (14) and the definition of A, the variable costs
to revenue ratio becomes
z˜−ηqx
px(qd + qf )
= θx.
Since xx = n(qd + qf ), total variable costs are
z˜−ηqx = θxpxxx/n = θxe
(
p¯
px
) α
1−α
.
Growth rate and R&D. From the optimal condition (10),
vt =
1
Akt
=
1
A
θn
θx
(
p¯
pn
) α
1−α
z˜−1t , ⇒
v˙t
vt
= −
˙˜zt
z˜t
.
Substitute vt and its growth rate into (11) to get (27). Equation (28) results from substituting
the growth rate (27) in the R&D technology (4), after using the definitions of k and D in (26).
Cutoff conditions. The cutoff survival productivity for non-exporters z∗ is given by the exit
condition
pin(z
∗) =
{
[1− (1 + η)θn] e+ ρˆθn
θx
}(
p¯
pn(z∗)
) α
1−α
− λ = 0.
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which rearranged gives (EC’). The derivation of the export cutoff is a bit more cumbersome.
Exporters’ profits are
pix(z) = px(z) (qd + qf )− z˜−ηqx − hx(z)− λ− λx.
Use the price equation (14) to substitute px in the definition of total revenues, then use the
definition of the A and θx = Aθd to get
px(z) (qd + qf ) = 1/θx z˜
−ηqx.
Use total variable cost as defined in (24) and R&D expenditures in (28), to rewrite profits as
pix(z) = [1− (1 + η)θx] e
(
px(z)
p¯
) α
α−1
+ ρˆ
(
px(z)
p¯
) α
α−1
− (λ+ λx),
The firm will export only if pix(z) > 0. However, this condition is necessary but not sufficient,
since a firm producing a traded variety could prefer to deviate by only serving the domestic
market. In this case, profits will become
pˆix(z) =
(
px(z)− z˜−η
)
qd − h− λ = 1− θd
θd
z˜−ηqd − h− λ.
From the definition of A,
qd + τqf = A(qd + qf ) ⇒ qf = (A− 1)/(τ −A)qd.
Substitute qf in
z˜−η(qd + qf ) = θde
(
px(z)
p¯
) α
α−1
⇒ z˜−ηqd =
τ − θx
θd
τ − 1 θd e
(
px(z)
p¯
) α
α−1
.
From the first order condition for innovation we get
hx =
(
τ − θx
θd
τ − 1 ηθd e− ρˆ
)(
px(z)
p¯
) α
α−1
,
implying that
pˆix(z) =
{
[1− (1 + η)θd]
τ − θx
θd
τ − 1
}
e
(
px(z)
p¯
) α
α−1
+ ρˆ
(
px(z)
p¯
) α
α−1
− λ.
A firm will decide to export only if pix(z) ≥ pˆix(z), which requires{
[1− (1 + η)θx]− [1− (1 + η)θd]
τ − θx
θd
τ − 1
}
e
(
px(z)
p¯
) α
α−1
≥ λx.
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The export cutoff is then defined by the indifference condition pix(z
∗
x) = pˆix(z
∗
x), which is (XC’)
in the text. For τ ∈ (1, 1/α), it is easy to see that the term in brackets at the left-hand-side of
the previous equation is decreasing in τ . Hence trade liberalization tends to reduce the export
cutoff z∗x.
Welfare. Substitute (35) into (1) to obtain:
ρU = ρ
∞∫
0
(lnXt + β lnYt) e
−ρt dt
= ln
(
nM
1
α e
p¯
)
+ β ln(βnMe) +
ηg
ρ
,
which is the steady state equilibrium welfare.
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Additional simulations. Here we show equilibrium innovation for firms around the export
cutoff. We take the ratio between the marginal exporting firm, z∗x + 1 and the marginal non-
exporter z∗x− 1, at different values of the trade cost, sufficiently away from the prohibitive level
to avoid values of the export cutoff close to infinite.
Equilibrium equations (23), (24) and (28), show that exporters are larger than non-exporters
and that they innovate more. Accordingly, Figure (6) shows that the marginal exporter inno-
vates more than the marginal non-exporting firm, and this difference increases substantially as
we move toward free trade. Hence, as trade costs decline, the marginal non-exporter enters the
export market and jumps on a higher innovation performance.
Figure 7 shows the welfare gains and the trade/autarky growth ratio for the model with
inactive selection margins. Both gains are substantially lower than those in the benchmark
model. Growth at the calibrated trade cost is only 8% higher than in autarky, strikingly lower
that the 57% difference obtained in the benchmark model. Welfare gains are just about 4.5%,
way below the 50% gains obtained in the benchmark model.
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Additional robustness checks. The robustness analysis in Table 3 suggests that dynamic
gains are substantially smaller than in the benchmark economy for low values of α, α = 0.1,
and high value for ρ, ρ = 0.05. Moreover, Figure 5 suggests that for values of the Pareto shape
κ close to two, the dynamics gains are small as well. Here we compute the moments for each
value of the robustness analysis in the text.
Table A.1
Model Fit: robustness
Target Data Bm. ρ = .01 ρ = .05 A = 30 A = 120 α = .1 α = .5
Growth rate (%) 1.2 1.2 1.33 1.0 0.64 3.32 0.90 1.70
Avg. Markup (%) 20 20 19 21 19.4 19.4 23 16.2
Share of exporters 18 18 15.1 24 17.2 18.2 31 4.12
IPR 8.6 8.6 8.1 10.2 8.60 8.6 10.4 6.21
R&D to sales (%) 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.10 2 2.57 2.10 2.49
Std. firm productivity (%) 75 85 85 85 85 85 85 85
Profit/Income (%) 25 26 26 28 26.8 26.8 27 25.7
Table A.2
Model Fit: robustness
Target Data Bm. β = .25 β = .75 φ = .05 φ = .2 κ = 1.07 κ = 2
Growth rate (%) 1.2 1.2 1.7 0.94 1.88 0.75 2.12 0.2
Avg. Markup (%) 20 20 18 20.8 14.9 25.1 21.4 16.5
Share of exporters 18 18 11.2 24 0.01 43 30.8 0.3
IPR 8.6 8.6 8.4 8.7 3.1 12.2 11.5 0.7
R&D to sales (%) 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.6 2.04 2.43 1.4
Std. firm productivity (%) 75 85 85 85 85 85 93.4 50
Profit/Income (%) 25 26 29 24.7 21.7 26 26 9.2
Tables A.1 and A.2 above suggest that the model’s fit is sensitive to departures from the bench-
mark calibration. Above all, we can see that for parameter values leading to low dynamic gains
in Table 3, the growth target is missed widely, as they deliver a counterfactually low equilib-
rium growth. Sensibly, the model predicts that for slow growing economies the contribution of
productivity dynamics to the gains from trade is lower.
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